![]() ![]() This applies to any encryption product to a greater or lesser extent.īut if you can shut your computer down and give the RAM a minute to die, then the attacker’s only recourse is a direct assault on the cryptography, which rarely if ever succeeds, given a decent password. The next point of potential weakness is in booting and password entry, which have already been covered by the audit.Īfter that, if an attacker is able to freeze your RAM with liquid nitrogen in the time it takes for you to put your coat on to go home then he may have you, and likewise if he can mount an “evil maid” attack. TrueCrypt has an attack surface during installation if your installation environment has been compromised then there’s no hope for you, whatever product you use. Consequently it has an enormous and very complex attack surface. OpenSSL is huge and has a vast repertoire of functions. Whilst this is true, quite apart from the fact that the TrueCrypt audit is continuing, there is a key difference. The source of TrueCrypt is available for anyone to look at, but in practice, everyone assumes someone else will do so and in the end, no one does. The Heartbleed bug and subsequent revelations about OpenSSL code quality have shaken confidence in open source. We have something which works, doesn’t crash and doesn’t trash your data. There appear to be no known critical bugs, and the features are sufficient, at least up to Windows 7.įeature creep leads to complexity, and complexity is the enemy of security. This leads to the question of the lack of ongoing support and updates, which would hopefully have encouraged an evolution of the development processes.īut updates are only needed to fix bugs or to introduce new features. The groundwork was laid when Microsoft was only just waking up to the need for a secure development methodology. But this is a bit like criticising a donkey for not being a horse. Much has been written on the negative side regarding TrueCrypt.įor example, the audit raised serious questions about code quality and the antediluvian build environment. And it’s inconceivable that the NSA wouldn’t have dwarfed that audit by its own efforts, despite which, TrueCrypt is understood to have thwarted the best efforts of criminal investigation teams.Īs for Windows, versions since NT and including Windows 7 and Server 2008 have been subjected to formal Common Criteria evaluations. An independent audit has delivered its verdict on the boot code with no critical issues found.As we’ve already noted, Edward Snowden has endorsed it more recently.Steve Gibson examined TrueCrypt a while back and declared his faith in it. ![]() So comparing Truecrypt against Bitlocker, what sources of assurance do we have? However, formal evaluation is not the only form of assurance. In simplistic terms, they check whether the Target of Evaluation (or ToE) can be relied upon to do what it says on the tin.Ī product may be built on the latest hyper-secure bullet-proof technology, but with only the vendor’s word for it a security architect working in the government arena would favour an independently assured product, even if theoretically not as strong. Product and system assurance schemes such as Common Criteria, CCTM and CAPS are at the heart of government security policies. But assurance is the measures I might take to reduce the risk of it burning down in the first place. I take out insurance to make good if my house burns down. The whole saga has brought into focus an issue which has been central to security thinking in government circles for many years, though much less so more widely: that of assurance. Since Bitlocker is only available on Ultimate Edition, which offers nothing else I might need, Truecrypt seemed the obvious choice. This was very shortly after I had taken delivery of a shiny new SSD and while I was planning the transfer of my Windows 7 installation to it, encrypting it on the way. Then suddenly and without warning at the end of May, the developers declared it unsafe to use and effectively killed it, recommending users move to Bitlocker (for Windows) or other tools for Mac and Linux. ![]()
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